According to consistent jurisprudence, the Court of Justice has held that an international agreement cannot undermine the distribution of powers provided for by the treaties or, therefore, the autonomy of the legal system of the Union, which the Court of Justice guarantees respect. This principle is particularly devoted to Article 344 of the TFUE, Member States agree not to submit disputes over the interpretation or application of treaties to any comparative method other than the one provided for (see conclusions 1/91, EU:C:1991:490, para. 35 and 1/00, EU:C:2002:231, para. 11 and 12; Commission/Ireland Judgments, C-459/03, EU:C:2006:345, para. 123 and 136, as well as Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation/Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461, point 13. Finally, with regard to the requirement, under Article 3 of EU Protocol 8, that membership is art. 344 TFUE , the Commission argues that another consequence of the fact that, in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 3, of the draft agreement, the EU`s accession to the ECHR does not impose on Member States, under Article 1, paragraph 3, of the treaty establishing the ECHR, an obligation under EU law with regard to the ECHR and the protocols relating to it, namely that a dispute between Member States over the interpretation or application of the ECHR is not strictly a dispute over the interpretation or application of the treaties, as stated in Article 344 TFUE. However, neither Article 3, paragraph 6, of the draft agreement nor paragraphs 65 and 66 of the draft explanatory report contain anything to indicate that this possibility is excluded. This is where I come to a very important point. If we take all the objections of the Court of Justice at face value and try to overcome them successively with formal amendments to the draft accession agreement, there is a real risk that the ECHR`s jurisdiction for human rights in the EU will be more limited than it is today. With regard to infringement measures in particular, the Commission notes that article 1, paragraph 3, of the draft agreement shows that EU law does not impose any obligation on Member States with regard to the ECHR and related protocols. Therefore, an appeal for breaches cannot, by definition, concern the non-compliance of a Member State`s obligations under the ECHR. However, the reference to Article 5 of the ECHR in Article 5 of the draft agreement is intended to ensure that membership does not affect the powers of the Court of Justice.
In accordance with Article 51, paragraph 1, of the Charter, Member States are bound by the fundamental rights defined at EU level as part of the implementation of EU law. To the extent that the prohibition of Article 55 of the ECHR could also deal with disputes between parties concerning the interpretation or application of provisions of an international act (as in the case of Member States, treaties and the Charter which have the same content as the provisions of the ECHR), Article 5 of the draft agreement means that this interpretation cannot be invoked against the Union.  These are just two principles formulated by all parties to the negotiations at the beginning of the negotiations in 2010. others included the subsidiary nature of the ECHR safeguard mechanism and the principle that ECHR amendments and adaptations should be limited to what is strictly necessary for EU membership as a non-governmental entity, see the CDDH report of its 70th meeting on 15 and 18 June 2010, CDDH (2010)010, para.